Jammer 6 never got an AAR out on this battle because of severe health problems which came up shortly afterwards. 8( Presented in the order they arrived in my mailbox: Gary Wollbach’s AAR: As I sit down to write up my After Action Review (AAR) for the Command Post Exercise (CPX) held August 22nd, I ask myself one question; "What the heck just happened?" As an overview, the North Koreans have launched a coordinated and highly effective surprise attack south destroying most of the 2nd Infantry Division. All that remains of the 2nd Infantry Division is a small group of units from 2nd Brigade and a small group from 3rd Brigade. (I must congratulate Jammer on his most eloquent write up and background for this CPX.) I was a member of the US Forces and commanded Task Force Jammer, the small group of forces from 3rd Brigade. TF Jammer consisted of a M1A1 tank company (18 tanks) a mechanized infantry company (13 BFVs, 13 Infantry teams, and 9 Javelin teams), and an Engineer platoon (3 squads with 3 M113s). TF Jammer was allowed to deploy anywhere on the far south edge of the map. I was assigned the portion of the map west of the 045 grid while the remainder of the US units had been instructed by the Umpire to deploy within 1500 meters of grid 0603. My Division orders stated my mission was to deny the enemy the use of the north south road system with a secondary mission to attrit enemy forces. My estimate of the enemy actions was that we would face at least a Regiment and up to a Division sized force. We discussed the possible actions and objectives of the enemy. I figured that their mission would be to exit south a certain percentage of forces, destroy us, and maybe secure a route system for follow on forces. Based on this I deployed my forces on the west side of the map on the east bank of the major river there, my intent being to remain in a close formation near the TF TOC and be able to support the other Brigade. At Startex, I moved units north rapidly and seized the town in grid 0302 with my infantry. I kept my tanks in the woods and in hide positions just to the east of the town. The engineers were blowing the southern bridges across the river. I began to bound my infantry by platoons north and had gotten as far north as 035030 when contact was made. The contact however was not from the north but due west. The enemy was using the west map edge. Based on the reports received from 2nd Brigade I concluded that the enemy had three routes of advance through our sector. One in the far east (and very heavily used and exiting units by this time) one in the center (which was appearing to succeed) and now one on the far west side. Two platoons of my infantry company became decisively engaged, rapidly loosing my BFVs. I then adjusted the remaining infantry platoon and it too took heavy losses. I began to worry that the west flank was totally exposed to enemy infiltration and was considering moving my tanks west, but my engineers and infantry were no longer reporting any more sightings. I was then given an additional mission to move one tank platoons further into the center sector and assist in plugging a possible hole which was developing in the center. I moved one tank platoon east, which eventually became the Division TOC security at grid 050020. I knew that the Division Commander was also eyeing my tank company for action in the east. Finally I received orders, 'withdraw and attrit the enemy'. I reminded the Commander that I had no contact and asked for clarification as to which order he wanted accomplished; withdraw or attrit?. His reply was "Yes". I then began withdrawing my tanks south, constantly observed west. This is when the battle was declared finished by the Umpire. Now I repeat my question; "What the heck just happened?" I expected a whirl wind of forces, flooding down on us in an never ending torrent of lead and steel. A combination of mass, fire power and speed. It ended up that the enemy mission was, as I understood it, simply to exit south. And instead of a flood I got a trickle. Seems that in addition to going south, the North Koreans took get pains to avoid contact. Good thing we have AARs because I think that is the only why I'm going to find out what happened. The write up made the situation sound very dire, our team discussions had concluded that a withdrawal of our forces (which was one option) was not going to be possible because we expected large numbers of North Korean hoards swarming over us. None of this happened. We could have exited the map with 100% forces and never fired a shot. I also could not believe that the North Koreans victory level was to exit 35% and they failed to accomplish that? "What the heck happened?" Lesson learned - and I really had to think about this - do not underestimate the power of a dismounted infantry soldier. There was a rule put into our operations orders by the Umpire that caused some confusion. It do not believe the rule ever really influenced actions during the battle although it did cause me some concern and did effect the way I deployed and operated my forces. The rule was that US forces could only give orders (including artillery) if the Division CP was stationary. If the Division CP was moving then orders could not be given to units if that unit was not within 1000 meters of the Battalion CP. The Battalion CP could not give orders to units unless the Battalion CP was within 1000 meters of the Division CP. Our team asked for clarification of this rule just before the battle began and the rule was repeated to us. I attempted to adhere to the technical aspects and spiritual aspects of this rule. When the battle was over I asked what was the Umpire's intent in issuing such a rule and was told by the Umpire there was no 1000 meter rule. I still do not understand the rule or what it was intended to accomplish or prevent from occurring. I do know that other Umpires have implemented some command and control rules to add some sense of realism and prevent unrealistic operations. Those rules all succeed or failed at varying levels depending on your point of view. The importance of the Division TOC was stressed several times and in several ways in the OPORD, to include being one of the primary factors for accomplishment of one of our teams missions. The protection of the Division TOC and its movement was a primary importance to our operations and we planned around the TOC's movement. I must also state that, like people, Umpires have certain ways they like things done. I was very upset over the way the Umpire rejected some of my requests for unit movement and deployment. He wanted them in a certain way and by jimmy that was the way it was going to be submitted. Okay, he's the Umpire, it is his show, I'll comply. But Umpires needs to insure that thier ways are known and understood by the players. Umpires must also understand that he holds the very life of the units I am commanding in his hands. He is not only the Umpire but is also playing the role of the platoon leader or company commander of my units. I give locations to move to and assign battle positions. Umpires are the ones actually laying out the route and moving that unit into position. I must assume that Umpires are choosing a tactically correct route and is setting up in positions with the minimum of unit exposure to the enemy. The grids we give for locations are not exact. An eight digit grid is only accurate to within 100 meters. There has to be flexibility in that grid location, it is not exact. I believe that TacOps is accurate to within 10 meters. There is no way I can give a grid that exact. That is why an order worded "Move F1 to the edge of woods and observe east" is not worded "Move F1 to grid 123456 and observe east". The unit may end up exposed to enemy visual detection at 4500 meters in the middle of an open field. That is not what I wanted. The interface between Umpires and the players is unique. I think I learn more from that interface than playing the battle. PS - I really loved the way this Umpire provided us with the real life hands on experience with communications problems. His original orders did say that 'weather is interfering with radio transmissions'. (snicker snicker ). Gary James Sterrett’s AAR, with help from Bill and Corinne: This CPX was umpiried by Jammer 6, run on Map 100. The Opfor players were: James Sterrett (CO & Togo); Corinne Mahaffey (Musashi); Bill Buckingham (Seppuku); Chris Brooks (Kamikaze). Our mission was to buy a 22000 point force (6000 of it infantry), enter map 100 at 0700, and exit 35%+ of our force by "as soon as possible". Planning was weird due to a lot of strange schedules; nonetheless planning occurred and we agreed to buy units in whole chunks for the most part. Following the purchase requirements for points and vehicle types, we bought 4 battalions of VTT323 mech infantry (BTR battalions with the BTRs changed to VTT323 and the AT-7s removed), a battalion of T-72, and some recon forces in the form of T-72s with tiny infantry teams riding on them. Our plan was to try to break through in the east whilst pinning the defending forces in the center and west. Our reading of the short story in the briefing lead us to think that we would face a front line with reserves, and we presumed that the first major stretch of open ground, along the main E-W road, would be the location of the enemy defence. Accordingly, one VTT323 battalion, "Seppuku", was tasked with attacking west of the north-south river and drawing attention to itself. east of the river and west of 06 easting, another VTT323 battalion, Musashi, would also serve as a pinning force, and hopefully clear out enemy resistance able to put flanking fire on the main effort. That main effort was Kamikaze, which had another VTT 323 battalion, tasked with finding a route east of 06 easting for Togo, the exploitation force, which had the final VTT323 battalion, and the T-72 battalion. All of our off-map artillery (4 batteries of 152mm with 150% of a normal ammo load) was intended to support Kamikaze, along with the mortar batteries in Togo and Kamikaze. Mushashi was on notice that its mortars would be tasked to Kamikaze as needed. Things did not go exactly according to plan. Seppuku, over in the far west, ran into far less opposition than expected, and would up exiting about a company of troops off the south edge of the map. Expecting direct resistance, we think the only fires came from across the river. Musashi arrived at the roadway and swiftly lost all its vehicles. However, apparently the enemy pulled back or we actually did some damage, since by the end of the game the Musashi infantry was advancing south with apparently little opposition. Kamikaze got to the roadway a little later than Musashi. While its westernmost company got hammered, its other two companies got across the roadway (at ~035 northing) easily. At this point the game had gone for about 30 minutes. We'd been debating if we should try to exploit west or east, but decided east looked more promising, especially as we did not know if the bridges were down (which would be troublesome for the tank battalion). Therefore the tanks were ordered south, basically in the 08-09 easting. The VTT323 battalion in the exploit force was ordered to cross the river to the east, then proceed south in the 09-10 easting area. However, it did not do this and both it and the tanks decided it was best to move as a large stack. This cost us when the US side slammed the grouping twice with MLRS around 085025. At about the same time Kim Il Sung began to harass us about getting forces off the map soon, and we learnt that in fact the exit deadline was 0800. Eventually we got 32% off the map, which might have risen to 34% if we were patient and Seppuku's mortars exited safely down the western edge. Technically, we lost, though all of us agreed that when we got down to it we did not feel beaten on a 3% miss. This report may seem a bit thin on the action; that is because we never got reports on what was being shot by us or at us. We were stunned to discover that we had inflicted major damage on the US (61% losses, while we took 52%); we couldn't tell we had done much to them at all. Lesson: it takes a bit more than just sitreps and spotreps to give a sense of the flow of the battle. Of course, if you want a restricted information flow, that's all to the good; we pieced together what had happened to us through the sitreps and generally had no clue what had happened to the enemy. Other lessons: Our deception forces were too large. Concentrating more heavily on our breakthrough sector would have gotten more troops through it faster and likely would have gotten more off the map. Seppuku probably should have been folded into Kamikaze, leaving Musashi as the sole deception effort. Movement orders for the exploit force obviously needed to be clearer. In order to clear up some confusion, we needed to set priorities for the artillery (working under intent-based orders) in the early going. Looking at the US casualty stats, it must have worked well; and in any event such orders are a good idea. (The prioritization orders were that ICM was to be reserved for M-1s, and that target priorities were M-1s, Javelins, M-2s, and other stuff, in that order.) This was also an experiment in having all players of an IRC CPX team in one room, and Chris Brooks set a TacOps CPX record as the youngest-ever player, being 11. These are actually related bits of information.... 8) Our work breakdown (in addition to our commands) was as follows: I ran the computer, typing, reading or printing out info as needed, and occasionally checking the overall situation map. Corinne ran the overall situation map (very well - I was able to understand all our positions and spotted enemies very easily when I looked at it). Bill ran his Seppuku force and helped Chris run Kamikaze - both helping with grid references, and doing an excellent job at helping Chris' tactical thinking whilst still leaving the decision at hand to Chris. Everybody had fun (though as the clock crept past midnight Chris got a bit sleepy!) and all in all this system worked pretty well. Off to read Gary's AAR that just came in.... "Seems that in addition to going south, the North Koreans took get pains to avoid contact." Yes - we did want to avoid fighting if possible... destroying US forces wasn't part of the mission and most of our forces were a light snack for an M-1. You lost contact with Bill in part because, I think, we figured out how to avoid your spotting his force as it edged south. "Good thing we have AARs because I think that is the only why I'm going to find out what happened." Agreed. 8) "I also could not believe that the North Koreans victory level was to exit 35% and they failed to accomplish that? 'What the heck happened?'" A substantial portion of our force was infantry, and when its carriers got blown away, it was too slow to take part in the breakthrough. We could have bought more tanks, but it would have meant trying to optimize force purchases, which none of us felt like messing with. Also, our three axis assault put too much force away from the main effort, so we bled a lot on secondary axes. Musashi, in particular, bled heavily. I'm interested to know if these actions (west of 06 easting) prevented US reserves from moving about, or delayed their movement? If so then they did at least do their job. Rick Nelson’s AAR: AAR for North Korean attack 8/22/98 The situation report for the US side was the same as for the NK. Up to the paragraph after "Minutes later, the lead T-72s of the 14th Armored appeared in the thermal sights of one of the 5th Cav's Bradleys, and opened fire." Then for the US side =============================================================== ======= General Rules: Map: 100 Visibility is 3000 meters, thermal 4000. The game ends at the end of the turn in which General White and his staff leave the board. Off board artillery and airstrikes may only be used as long as a Command Section (8), or part of one, survives. When the last Command Section is eliminated, that side must immediately Cease Fire, by using the Cease Fire button of any active off board artillery batteries or air strike, and may not use them for the rest of the game. This will all be handled by the referee. It is suspected that some of the North Korean tanks have thermal sights. The U.S. player can only change orders on all units as long as the Command Section representing General White is stationary, because the weather is interfering with radio transmissions. If General White moves, the U.S. player can¹t adjust artillery, either on or off board, or give orders to units that aren¹t within 1000 meters of one of the player's Command Section. Each player will have a Command Section for use with this rule, without charge. Objectives: The U.S. objective to either attrit and withdraw successfully, or stop the North Korean 14th Armored Division. You will make this decision, General, depending on your estimate of the situation. Attrition is accomplished by inflicting 20% casualties on the North Korean force. Withdrawal is accomplished by withdrawing General White and his staff, and 40% of the U.S. force off the south edge of the map. Stopping the 14th Division is accomplished by preventing the North Koreans from fulfilling their victory conditions. Forces: General White¹s headquarters: Command Section (8), and 2 M577 Command Vehicles. Remnants, 1/72nd Armored Battalion: 12 M1A2 Tanks 3 Inf FO teams Remnants, 1/31st Infantry Battalion: Three Infantry Companies, each consisting of: 12 Six man infantry teams 9 Javelin teams 3 Stinger teams 3 HMMWVs w/ HMG 1 Inf FO team Remnants, 5th Cavalry Regiment: Two Scout Platoons, chosen from the ³Add Optional Units, U.S.² Menu Item Task Force Jammer: 4000 points. No UAVs DIVARTY is in support, with three 155 batteries, with default ammo, and 1 MRL batteries, with default ammo. The snow has grounded TacAir, there are no airstrikes available, and none are going to become available. Snow has likewise made ammunition resupply to artillery units impossible, and so the chance of additional ammunition to off board artillery is zero. Please notify me on your final roster, which player those units have been assigned to, and callsigns of all units. Each player will determine the starting points for those units you assign to him. Setup Point Napolean is defined as 060030. General White¹s headquarters sets up anywhere within 500 meters of Point Napolean. The Remnants of the 1/72, the 1/31st and the 5th Cav set up anywhere within 1500 meters of Point Napolean. Task Force Jammer sets up anywhere touching the south edge of the map. =============================================================== ======= There was quite a bit of discussion between the four of us on the best strategy. It appeared that we would be facing a Division, and we were sure that we wouldn't be able to cause 20% casualties and be able to withdraw. Especially since the 2nd Brigade had no transport other than a few HMMVWs. The other victory condition was "preventing the North Koreans from fulfilling their victory conditions". One of us observed that it was "Interesting how attrition 20% of the OPFOR is different from stopping them. This implies that they have a special mission other than moving off the map with 80% of their forces." I decided that a likely objective of the NK would be to secure a route into Seoul, 5 km to the South, so I decided to position our forces to 1). protect the HQ, and 2). deny the NK the use of the major north - south route. Nic (2nd Brigade) was to position his forces to protect the HQ, which was 500 meters south of Point Napoleon, and Gary (TF Jammer) was to move north along the east side of the river and take up positions to control the road. His engineers also were to destroy as many bridges as they could, starting in the SW corner. The lower three were destroyed, but interestingly enough the NK managed to cross the river with a tank anyway. Must have been one of their secret floating tanks :-). Christian (5th Cav) was in charge of recon. He positioned his vehicles, in pairs, in front of the 2nd Brigade and moved them outward at the start of the time. As the game developed, it appeared that the NK weren't going to try to force the road. My impression was of a general attack all along the front. I was somewhat hampered by a lack of battle reports and wasn't aware of how intense the combat was until Nic reported that 50% of his forces were gone. Generally, the only indication that combat was taking place was the shortening of the length of the situation report as units were destroyed, and the appearance of a lot of walking infantry on the spot report as NK units were eliminated. I would have liked something such as "VTT323 company engaged by Javelin platoon, heavy losses both sides". We realized that the NK were moving a lot of vehicles to the east of our positions. Nic requested, and was granted, control of the MLRS. He said he thought he knew where they were. In two salvos we got a report of many secondaries. For this he was presented the Divisional Blind Shooting Award :-). "It's MLRS Time!". Nic also moved two tank platoons to an open area in the SE to set up an ambush for the NK forces. Unfortunately, he ran into T72s instead of VTTs, and the platoons were eliminated. Along with some of the T72s. At this time we started discussing the withdrawal of our forces. We'd moved the HQ once, about 2 km to the sw, and were going to move it south along with the remains of TF Jammer. 2nd Brigade was almost gone, and the trucks I'd sent him had been destroyed, so he wasn't going to be able to withdraw. At this time the ref called the end of the game. =============================================================== ===== This was another of those CPXs in which neither side knows what the other is trying to do. We thought from the situation report, "It passed through the shattered 6th Armored quickly, and took up the hunt for the Second Division", that the NK were going to try to find and destroy our HQ. The NK were doing a penetration and weren't aware that we were protecting a HQ in the center of the map. Most of two battalions were decimated assulting that area. Once the NK found the unguarded east, they were quick to exploit it. Without the MLRS, more than 32% of the forces would have exited. I wonder if the NK suspected a trap of some sort when they encountered so little resistance in the east. In another CPX a while ago, the attackers exited the map through a weakly protected area only to find that the objective of the defenders was to funnel them to that area. Rick My reply to the last question in rick’s AAR: >I wonder if the NK suspected a trap of some sort when they encountered >so little resistance in the east. In another CPX a while ago, the >attackers exited the map through a weakly protected area only to find >that the objective of the defenders was to funnel them to that area. We didn't - perhaps because we hit resistance only in the center. Had there been only the eastern hole we'd likely have been more worried, oddly. The lack of combat reports also meant it was unclear to us that we hadn't punched through some manner of resistance in the east. However, all in all, we found a hole and drove into it, fat, dumb, and happy - if you had a trap off-map. 8) And Nic Uloth’s AAR: After reading thr AARs of Gary and James Sterrett it looks like I had the best view of the battle. I was commanding the remnants of 2 battalions: 1/72 Armored Battalion: primarily 12 M1A2 Tanks 1/31st Infantry Battalion: 3 infantry Companies each primarily 12 Infantry Teams and 9 Javelin Teams I also ended up taking command of the scouts shortly after starting the game. 5 Cav 5 M3s mounting scouts After some email amongst the US commanders, our Division objective was determined to be either exit our Div HQ and 40% of our forces south or attrite the enemy. Actually the second objective was to prevent the enemy meeting his objectives which Rick guessed was to exit south. Rick placed the initial emphasis on attriting the enemy with a later withdrawal if things got too hairy. Taking into account the setup positions rick assigned me to defend east of 045. While Gary was assigned West of 045. The defence of the 5.5km of front west of 045 was tricky. The setup of my forces was restricted to 1500m of point napoleon in the middle of the map (060030). This meant that the eastern most 2.5km was initially wide open. Ameliorating this was a river, forested terrain and few trails or roads leading south, that would slow the enemy down in that sector. I didn’t put much faith in the river as a barrier as the amphibious APCs available to typically OPFOR greatly reduces rivers as barriers. My second problem was the terrain, it was heavy wooded making it possible for the enemy to advance to contact under cover and making mutual support of positions difficult. The third problem was mobility, the bulk of my force was foot bound. By making use of the weapons platoon (4 Humvees with HMGs) in each company one company of the infantry could be moved at once. The problem of the Humvees is their vulnerability to small arms fire making redeployment with even a few enemy inf around difficult. In addition another company could ride on the tanks if necessary. My general impression was that the situation didn’t look very good at all, I was going to get overrun by a mass of tanks and APCs appearing at close range out of the forests, swamping my forces. I didn’t think the plan to attrite the enemy would last long and that we would have to switch to a withdrawal pretty quick. We had no barriers, mines, prepared positions or even as it turned out artillery tactical reference points, so it was a hasty defence rather then a prepared one. I had little hope of withdrawing together with the rest of the division as I was not mobile enough, rather my forces would form the rearguard and buy time. So I deployed my forces according to the following principals: 1) The center of the resistance would be north of the DIV HQ as if we lost that we couldn't fulfil our withdrawal. 2) The line of resistance would be the open valley north of 030 running east-west. This valley is forested on both sides and has a width of between 0.5km to 200m. 3) Infantry would be deployed on the northern side of the valley at the southern forest edge at points that trails and gullies running north south ended. The objective was to engage enemy columns at close range with LAWs and machine guns in the forest at points where they were expected to emerge into the valley. 4) The javelin teams would be deployed as platoons on the southern side of the valley on the northern edge of the forest. They were deployed to completely cover the forest on the northern valley side. 5) One company of infantry mounted on the tanks would be deployed behind the valley on a parallel east-west road and would be tasked as the reserve to shift rapidly east to meet any breakthrough. 6) FOs would be placed in the best observation positions partially to direct arty and provide intelligence but also partly because I expected these positions to be obvious positions for enemy arty strikes and I didn’t want to deploy significant forces there. 7) The last 2km of my sector to the east would be left open apart from a platoon of infantry tasked with covering the only bridge over the river. Rather then try to hold everything lightly, I decided to hold the most important bit reasonably well and give Rick enough time to withdraw the DIV HQ before I was overrun. The game started with the leader of the scouts having a series of problems including the collapse of the table with his PC on it (a dastardly act obviously carried out enemy infiltrators probably inserted by mini-sub) . I took over the scouts temporarily but this turned out to be permanent arrangement . The scouts were to deploy with the same restrictions as my forces so the first job was to get them moving north and east to find the enemy. The enemy appeared quite quickly everywhere along the front in company sized groups of APCs. The enemy units which appeared in the center of my defence met a hail of LAW and Javelin fire later reinforced by tank fires as I moved my tanks to the southern tree-line of the valley. This appeared to stop them. Those enemy companies that appeared further east where attrited but not stopped and exited the valley moving south. Even further east the scouts and an infantry platoon detected more APCs and T72 tanks but could do little to stop them. Ricks started withdrawing the DIV HQ south and most of his attention was directed towards coordinating with Gary. The initial wave of enemy APCs to the east was followed by a second wave primarily to the east that met no opposition as all my forces there had been wiped out. At this point I asked rick for the MRLS as the heavily wooded terrain was likely to channel the enemy down a gully. This guess turned out to be correct and the after-shocks after 2 MRLS strikes appeared to indicate that at least a company and half of enemy vehicles had been wiped out. By now the units at the main defensive position were down to 60% strength but no new enemy forces had appeared for a while and their role as rearguard was no longer important as the DIV HQ joined up with Garys forces. I thus moved my armored reserve to the south east corner to try to ambush more enemy APCs before they exited the map. The ambush force managed to catch a company of APCs in the open and destroyed them but they were followed by a battalion of enemy T72s which totally wiped out the tanks. As a last desperate measure we vectored airstrikes onto the T72s which did catch them in the open but unfortunately the AAA was too heavy and the strike was aborted. By now I was down to 2 M3s from the scouts and 50% of my infantry. The far eastern sector was wide open and I my force was effectively destroyed with no mobility and limited AT weapons. The only saving grace was it appeared that the enemy was also expended. Shortly after Jammer stopped the game. I was surprised as to the scale of the losses suffered by the N Koreans. As my forces were always deployed in strength and the battles were fought at such short ranges (often below 500m) I think the OPFOR commanders comment that his sitreps didn’t show significant enemy forces was probably due to the intensity of combat, with whole platoons being wiped out between sitreps. In the far eastern sector though there simply wasn’t many forces present. On my part I had the impression that enemy companies were being withdrawn after contact but I did see the initial contacts. Lessons Learned: 1) The defence worked out well with the only problem being that forward deployed infantry teams are almost impossible to extricate with trucks or Humvees if a withdrawal is called. 2) The grouping of Javelins into platoons rather then distributing them to the line platoons was correct as it allows them to placed in positions suitable to the Javelin weapons system and ensured that they engage the enemy en-mass. 3) More coordination with the recon commander was necessary before the game to create a coordinated recon plan for each sector. 4) The armored reserve could have been moved more aggressively. Together with their mounted infantry they could have setup a blocking position to the east as soon as a breakthrough was detected and thus accounted for more enemy APCs. 5) There was little coordination between myself and Gary to the west. A company of enemy APCs penetrated down the boundary between our forces partly due to it being a no-mans land for both of us. I’m not sure if Gary ever stopped them, I know I didn’t. 6) A though terrain analysis is essential for a defender to detect choke points which can then be blocked with infantry and arty fires. 7) The N Korean APC is a crummy vehicle - only a 12mm MG and Sagger ATGM. Given the scale of N Korean forces ( 5 Bns ) , when compared to our limited defense (2 Bns to cover 10km of front) , I would say we did well to limit their exited force to 32%, but because they exited significant forces from the map I guess we lost the war. In James Sterret’s AAR he ponders… "Musashi, in particular, bled heavily. I'm interested to know if these actions (west of 06 easting) prevented US reserves from moving about, or delayed their movement? If so then they did at least do their job." On one hand Musashi did pin the majority of my forces and after thier APCs had been destroyed the dismounts kept chewing away at my infantry. On the other hand I didn’t have the mobility to move the infantry, and given their role as defending the DIV HQ, they couldn’t risk going anywhere anyways. Special mention has to be made of Rick's secondary role as cultural awarness officer - researching on the web the 2nd Inf Div and Korean town names. It just added that little bit to remind you that you weren't fighting the Warsaw Pact in W Germany. I'd like to thank Jammer 6 for an enjoyable and interesting game. Nic Followed by further considerations from Gary Wollbach: It occurs to me, after reading the AARs, that the mission for TF Jammer seems to have been hazy, unclear, and confused by some. It was interesting that OPFOR commanders and my follow team mates referred to my unit's mission as 'reserve'. I thought my mission was clear, prevent usage of the north south road. Our unit never designated a reserve, although my tank company was defacto reserve (and never committed). But it seems obvious that other commanders were expecting me to do more. Rereading the Umpire's write up, TF Jammers mission is never specified, only the teams mission is spelled out, although in hindsight it appears as if that was also the Umpire's intent; to use TF Jammer as a reserve or counterattack force, but he did leave it up to us. I admit that my coordination between units was not even on my checklist for the days activities. My error. At the time I made contact with the 'diversion' force in the west I was attempting to flank the OPFOR and was closing this gap. What if we had placed TF Jammer centrally on the map's south edge? I feel that I would have be committed to the main threat force axis and the outcome of the entire battle would have changed. Well, enough of beating this dead horde - see ya'll on the next battlefield. gary To which Rick Nelson replied: > It occurs to me, after reading the AARs, that the mission for TF Jammer > seems to have been hazy, unclear, and confused by some. It was > interesting that OPFOR commanders and my follow team mates referred to > my unit's mission as 'reserve'. I thought my mission was clear, prevent > usage of the north south road. That was exactly what I intended. And they didn't get very far down that road :-). In hindsight, I could have ordered you to take that tank company either west or east. But I didn't and the respossibility is mine. But remember, the North Koreans didn't achieve their victory conditions, and we did. I'll leave the discussion about what I think about "winning" as related to a CPX for a day when I have more time :-) Rick