This is an article I recently translated for a colleague; thought it might prove of interest to 
people on these lists.

It is from _Vestnik vozdushnovo flota_  (_Air Force Herald_), the main journal of the 
Red Air Force in the interwar years (since - 1950s? - it has changed its name to 
_Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika_ and is still in print.)  

The after-action report describes activity in suppressing the Basmachi, a collection of 
small bands in Central Asia who resisted Soviet power in the 1920s and early 1930s.

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	A. Borisov.  "Desant onto the sand in aircraft".  _Vestnik vozdushnovo flota_, 
January 1929, pp. 11-13.  Trans J. Sterrett.


	At the time of one of the operations against bands we conducted the landing of a 
small desant.  The organisation and execution of the desant provides the possibility of 
drawing several conclusions which may be of use in the organisation of similar 
operations or larger ones.

	Deep in the sands our aircraft strafed a band.  The band, taking losses, began to 
retreat to the west.  After a second strafing, whilst they ere on the march, the band 
dispersed into the sands.  The direction of their movement was not known: the growths of 
haloxylon [a plant - don't know more about it - JS] gave the band the ability to hide from 
the aircraft.  Thus, it was not possible to fix the location of the band from the air.  It was 
necessary to conduct the pursuit on the ground in the region where the band had hidden 
after the second strafing.  Moving a cavalry detachment would have required long 
preparation.

	It was decided to use four passenger aircraft to land a small desant.  In fact only 
three aircraft took part in the operation.

	In the region where the landing was to be conducted there was the possibility of 
bands appearing on horseback.
	
	Each aircraft carried 3 soldiers.  In addition, the pilot and mechanic were included 
in the count of armed soldiers.  Light handheld machine guns were carried on the first 
and second aircraft, but the third aircraft carried a heavy machine gun with two belts.  
All, other than the machine-gunners, were armed with carbines.  In all the desant 
comprised 15 men.

	The detachment was assembled.  It was composed of the commanders of various 
units, who had expressed an interest in taking part in the operation.  The soldier-
commanders did not know each other very well.  The commander of one of the cavalry 
groups was designated to be the commander of the desant while on the ground.  The 
technical preparations were assigned to the commander of one of the aviation 
detachments; the command of the force while in the air was assigned to the commander 
of another aviation detachment.

	A recon of the area for landing sites was conducted a day before the airplanes 
flew out.  The place suggested by the recon for the desant consisted of a number of 
connected high sandy knolls, covered in haloxylon and having a few very large hollows.  
For 2-3 kilometers there was a small open takyr [local term - JS] with hard ground, level 
overall and with good approaches.  On that takyr it would with difficulty be possible to 
land one aircraft, as it was spoilt by small hillocks and haloxylon shrubs scattered at 
random along the entire takyr.

	6-7 kilometers away was a shor.  A shor is a open sandy area with a more or less 
level surface.  It had no shrubs.  Doubts arose as to the nature of the sand, but the main 
problem with the landing site was its distance from the objective.  However, given the 
problems with the other landing sites, this one was selected.

	In the evening the passenger aircraft and three recon aircraft flew to a previously 
prepared aerodrome in the sands.  At first light of the following day, with full tanks and a 
reserve of water and food, the aircraft flew deeper into the sands to the west.  Arriving at 
the intended landing site, the aircraft landed safely one after the other.  The direction of 
the wind across the sand was determined by the wear of the aircraft [paying attention to 
how the aircraft reacted to the wind at various headings, I presume - JS].  Here the main 
role was played by the experience of the pilots, who had previously conducted many 
landings in the sands.  On landing one of the aircraft's wheels sank deeply into the sand, 
and was pulled out with difficulty; the other aircraft landed on harder sand.  The aircraft 
were moved to their departure positions.

	5 men stayed with the aircraft; one pilot, one mechanic for each aircraft, and a 
machinegunner with the heavy machinegun.  When the first shot was fired, the aircraft 
engines were to be started.  The machinegunner was to deploy in a firing position on a 
hillock not far from the aircraft.  In the event of the withdrawal of the recon group the 
machinegunner was to cover the retreat.

	The group expected to cover a large area; therefore it was split into two recon 
parties of 5 men each.  The soldier-commanders were given orders that not one of them, 
regardless of enemy strength, was to retreat without orders.

	A standing patrol of recon aircraft was maintained in the air overhead.  After a 
given length of time another aircraft would fly out from the forward aerodrome to replace 
the one then on patrol.  The desant was 1 hour, 15 minute's flying time from the forward 
airfield.  The recon aircraft covered, as necessary, areas close to the desant and out to 10-
12 kilometers away.

	The enemy was not found by the recon, and the detachment concluded its recon 
after 3-4 hours.  The detachment examined the ground carefully, and did succeed in 
determining the direction of motion of the band, and by a variety of signs deduced its 
size.  Having finished this work the detachment returned to the aircraft.  In order to ease 
the takeoff all of the water was poured out.

	The first and second aircraft took off easily and headed east.  The second magneto 
on the third aircraft failed, and the pilot and mechanic set to work.  There was no means 
of signalling to the other aircraft of the motor failure.  However, the other pilots noticed 
the absence of the third aircraft and turned back.  One aircraft landed again; but soon all 
the aircraft were in the air and all returned safely to the forward aerodrome, mission 
complete.

	The operational situation may at any time demand from aviation the landing of a 
desant.  Depending on the nature of the combat action and the nature of the theatre, the 
desant may be of various sizes.  We should not ignore the possibility of a powerful 
independent detachment, lifted in a large number of heavy transport aircraft, or of small 
diversionary or recon detachments of only a few tens of soldiers.

	First of all it is necessary to remember that the carried group should not be 
collected, regardless of its size.  The organisation of the detachment in the operation just 
described was not entirely correct: the soldiers were all commanders, largely unknown to 
the detachment commander and to each other.

	The conduct of the desant described above allows several conclusions to be 
drawn, which might be of some use in wider study of the problem of desant operations.

	1)  The landing area should be as close as possible to the objective of the desant in 
order to avoid extra movement, in the interests of economising on time.  In the course of 
the difficulties of forcing various obstacles on foot the desant may lose the advantage of 
surprise.

	2)  An hour or half an hour before the departure of the aircraft, recon ought to fly 
out, who will conduct a detailed recon of the landing site.  These recon aircraft should 
meet with the desant force and lead it to the landing site, even from the airfield if it would 
mean no longer waiting period for the transports.

	3) After the departure of the aircraft, the aircraft must be prepared for departure.  
The pilots and mechanics must check the functionality of all the motors.  Only thus is it 
possible to count on the proper functioning of all aircraft once the detachment departs.

	4) The pilot and the mechanic should not leave the aircraft, in case the 
commander wants the aircraft to go to a different landing site, as designated during the 
briefing on the ground.  This is very important, in order to avoid being tied to one landing 
site.  Therefore, no matter how small the desant, the pilot and mechanic must not be 
counted as soldiers; moreover, they must not be diverted from the work connected with 
the maintenance of the aircraft and flying them.

	5) Aircraft should be supplied with smoke bombs, which the pilot could throw 
onto the ground in order to determine the direction and strength of the wind before 
landing.  Even if this is not so important in a developed theatre, in undeveloped theatres, 
and even more in unpopulated deserts, with highly variable strength and direction of wind 
at various levels of the atmosphere, such bombs, providing a great deal of smoke, are an 
absolute necessity.

	6) After the landing, the motors should be covered with sandproof covers.

	7) Recon aircraft should patrol the area continually, providing the detachment 
commander with timely reports of any new developments.

	8) There should always be recon on the lookout for new landing sites, against the 
possibility of a new movement of the desant into that region.    This might take place over 
small distances of 20-50 kilometers.

	9) There should be good communications between the recon and the desant 
commander.  If it is not possible to use radio, then it is necessary to establish an air 
signalling post on the area of the transport's landing, and connect that to the desant by 
means of a field telephone.  [There were a number of moderately developed means of 
exchanging packets from air to ground and vice versa, without the aircraft having to 
actually land. - JS]

	10) A medical aircraft must be included in the desant.

	11) In the event that the desant landing in a developed area with lots of good 
roads, it would be useful to include motorcyclists for communications.

	12) The desant should be landed at a point and with a mission, such that the 
results will tell on the main strength of the enemy and the results can be utilised, or the 
action of the desant must correspond to the actions of major air formations.  A desant by 
itself, isolated and unconnected to the work of the main force, cannot be successful, 
unless it is put in a region where the political situation is such that the desant can provide 
an organised cell and begin activity in the enemy's immediate rear or in his homeland.

	13) The nature of the actions of the detachment landed by aircraft must be 
extremely swift, bold, and decisive.  Lengthy battles and extensive preparations should 
not be counted on.  In the event that the commander of the desant notes that the action is 
unlikely to be successful, the detachment should swiftly move to the landing site or to a 
new landing site under cover of aircraft acting from the air with machineguns and bombs, 
load up, and move to a different region uncomfortable for the enemy.

	13) [sic]  Aircraft should only begin to depart when it is certain that all of their 
motors are functional.

	It would be useful if this short article, with its noted conclusions and questions on 
the operational and technical organisation of desants, was provided to our aerial and 
ground commanders.


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