GRU

Main Intelligence Directorate

January 1, 2010

Satellite Status Report

(For information on how satellites will be gamed in this MBX, go to the Satellites & UAVs document.)

Background

Fortunately for us, the United States has been forced to put its space program on hold for a number of years due to the computer virus that infected their entire infrastructure. This allowed us to catch up to their formerly superior technology and develop the Arkon-1, an advanced electro-optical satellite that is every bit as good as their KH12, and the Oblik, a radar-imaging satellite that matches up with the US Lacrosse. We continue to maintain parity with the US in SIGINT reconnaissance as well, with the Tselina II. These top-rated satellites, while few in number at the moment, will soon be more available as the months go by. This means that with our current rate of launches we could easily have more of these airborne than the US by the end of the year.

In the meantime, we will supplement our fleet with periodic launchings of Yantar and Odets class satellites, both of which have short lifespans of only a few months and use film-return capsules, which adds an extra day to the mission. The Yantar is small and inexpensive, making it the most readily available, while the Odets has a longer lifespan and has as many as 22 separate capsules.

While we may not yet have an edge in photo-recon capability, we do have far more oceanic surveillance satellites in operation than the US, with a constellation of six US-A and US-K RORSATs that allow us to keep tabs on NATO shipping anywhere in the world. These satellites, with their crude radar and unimpressive resolution specs, are considered dinosaurs by some, but the Admiralty believes that even a blurry blip on the screen is better than no detection at all, and their ability to send weapons targeting data during tactical combat could come in handy in a pinch. These, combined with our Tselina I EORSATs, give us a great wealth of data on ocean traffic.

Where we are falling behind is in the area of data processing. Nearly all of our strategic missions -- especially SIGINT assignments -- take a considerable amount of time to resolve, as our computers simply don't have the speed to process the new, highly detailed data quickly and efficiently. And most of our tactical missions need to be pared down to the simplest assignments to prevent ground stations and operators from being overloaded. The GenShtab is aware of these shortcomings and has taken action, but we do not expect to see any significant improvement in computer capabilities for at least a year or so.

ASAT Program

The one major project we have been working on (in addition to faster computers) is in the area of anti-satellite (ASAT) warfare. Our most recent model, codenamed Kondor, is launched along the same flightpath as the target satellite and uses its lighter mass to gain speed and catch up to it within one or two orbits. Once within 100 meters or so, it uses a conventional explosive which, on command from ground control, destroys both itself and the target. So far, one test of the Kamikaze system has been completed successfully, which involved a dummy Odets.

A second ASAT capability is actually older than the Co-orbital ASAT but also much more limited in range. Since the 1960's the USSR/Russian Federation has operated a limited ABM system around Moscow. This system uses the Gazelle and the Gorgon missiles for endo- and exo-atmospheric engagements, respectively. The silo-launched Gorgon is probably capable of intercepting very low altitude (up to elevation E3) satellites which pass above the Moscow region. This substantially limits the number of satellites potentially vulnerable to the Gorgon, which would be guided to its target by the new Pill Box phased-array radar at Pushkino. Moreover, the use of a nuclear warhead at a low altitude above Moscow would result in collateral damage due to the effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Obviously, these missiles would only be used under the most extreme situations.

US "Black" Projects

There have been rumors of a stealth version of the KH12 but so far nothing has been confirmed. We know that this was one of several projects that the US was tinkering with before the computer virus hit but we are not aware of any of these satellites being launched. A stealth KH satellite would pose a serious problem for us, since we would not know when to dodge it, and because it can't be picked up by radar it would of course be immune to any ASAT attack.

GRU operatives have learned that the US has also proposed some sort of ASAT weapon, this one apparently being a space-based laser (SBL). We know that several sections of this weapon were launched and assembled within the past year, but it appears progress has slowed down due to demands in other areas.

Foreign systems

The UK, France,Japan and Australia all maintain at least one or two photo-optical satellites, all of about the same quality as our own Yantar series. These are generally used in seaways or near land approaches to their own countries, not for observation of Russia.

China has stepped up its own satellite launch schedule, and now has four photo-optical satellites aloft, two of which are Shensou-2s, which are a notch lower in quality than the Yantar, the other two of which are higher-quality FSW satellites hovering over China's southern border and Taiwan. They also manage to keep at least one DFH-10 aloft as well, which provides coverage of the South China Sea and adjoining seas. China's space program produces a launch every 2-3 months, which is enough to maintain this six-unit fleet as well as contract out its lift for one other country on occasion, the most recent one being Pakistan.

Both Iran and Iraq have contracted with us to launch their own satellites. Both of which are Badr-B types -- identicle to the Yantar. Both countries have one of these satellites in orbit at all times.

Current status of Russian satellites

Please refer to the Satellite Tracking Maps for details on current position of our satellite fleet.

Comments

The payload for each launch must be decided on at least 1 month before the projected launch date.

There is a 15% chance of some sort of launch failure. Degree of the failure is decided by a D6, with the following die-roll possibilities:

1 = A delay of 1 x D6 days

2 = A delay of 1x ( D10 + 1 ) days

3 = A delay of 3 x ( D10 + 1 ) days

4 = Mission scrubbed

5 = Mission scrubbed

6 = Mid-air explosion, entire launch program delayed 1-3 months. (As determined by D6)

This report will be updated as needed. Please refer all mission instructions and requests to the GRU.

END REPORT.