From: General Commanding, Northern Army Group
To: RULDIST
Info: Northern Fleet, Northern Air Army
Subj: Operation Prestone
Clas: TS

I. In concert with Northern Fleet operations Northern Army Group will conduct a cross border assault on northern Norway..

II. The assault will be performed in three phases
III. Phase 1. Start time for the assault will be initial attack time of Northern Fleet.
     A. Initial force of normal army border defense forces will attack and seize Kirkenes. Then continue on toward Banak in a feint.
1. Forces assigned are
a. 1 tank battalion
b. 2 motor rifle battalions
c. 3 batteries 150 towed guns
d. 2 companies commandanteur
e. 1 helicopter transport squadron (16 Hip)
f. 1 attack helicopter flight (4 Hind)
2. Initial force limitations are to avoid compromising security of the
overall operation and concurrent Northern Fleet operations

3. Axis of attack is along the coast highway between Pachanga and Kikenes maintaining flank security.
4. Once secured support elements of 3 transport and 1 assault helicopter regiment will develop a forward operating base at Kirkenes airport

a. These units are presently at Taybola NW Army Airfield

Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 1: Prestone area map

     B. Once the initial force captures Kirkenes lead elements of the Retrieval Forces will assault Seida and reinforce the forces at Banak.
1. Forces assigned are:
2 helicopter transport regiment
2 assault helicopter squadrons
1 engineer battalion
1 signal battalion
1 anti-aircraft regiment
1 artillery battalion
1 battalion SPETZNATZ

2. The SPETZNATZ BN and one Transport Regiments will capture Seida making it unusable for NATO forces and available for emergency landings. They will also secure the girder Highway bridge if it is still intact. Once both areas are secure they will deploy Forward Observer teams equipped with LASER Designators to call in airstrikes if needed on Norwegian military targets. They will retain their transport helos for self retrieval on order.
3. The motor rifle division presently based in Kil'dinstroy South of Murmansk will mobilize and move to the border area to act as rear guard and reserve if needed.
4. The antiaircraft regiment will develop defensive positions around Seida, Kirkenes, and Banak via air transport if possible.
5. One assault helo squadrons will conduct close air support missions in support of the ground operations as needed. The remaining Helos will stage to Banak.
6. Engineers will work to improve the airfield facilities as needed to support the retrieval operations including preparing defensive positions.
7. Forces from Phase 1a will continue to attack toward Banak in a convincing manner.

    C. The desant force will capture the airfield at Banak, reinforce the forces at Kirkenes and provide forces to the Northern Fleet for their operations.
1. Forces assigned
a. 1 airborne division
b. 3 heavy air transport regiments (36 An22)
c. 1 helicopter transport regiment
d. 2 helicopter assault squadrons
2. The airborne division stages out of Afrikanda airfield W of Kursk
3. The helicopter element stages out of Taybola NW
4. One Brigade will drop on Banak. One Brigade will reinforce Kirkenes by either airdrop or air landing (as the situation dictates). The rest of the Division will be assigned objectives by Northern Fleet Operations. The helos will stage to Banak.

     D. Naval Aviation and Frontal Aviation elements will conduct air attacks in support of the operation. These are found in the various ATO from Northern Fleet.

IV. The second phase will consist of the retrieval of Russian forces in Norway.
A. Andoya
1.Helos from Banak will move to retrieve the forces in Andoya.
2. Helos will bring the troops to Banak, refuel and move to pick up forces elsewhere as needed.
B. Troops deployed to Banak will begin to redeploy back to Russia via helos from Kirkenes and aircraft as available. Heavy equipment that will not fit in the helos will be destroyed
C. Units in Kirkenes/Seida will redeploy back to Russia on order

 D. The land forces will retrograde to Russia on order.

V. The final phase is complete withdrawl of Russian forces from Norway in 72 hours of the beginning of the attack.
A. All available assets will be used to secure Russian troops from Norwegian territory as quickly as possible once the order is given.

VI. Notes and considerations

    A. The status of Finland, though a NATO member is unclear, unless they initiate hostilities units must not cross their borders or engage their forces. This directive also applies to Sweden which has become increasingly proNATO in the last ten years.
    B. The pace and extent of operations is dictated by speed and necessity. We are not trying to conquer Norway only prevent itís forces from interfering in our military operations. The Fleet operations should be finished within 72 hours. This is the same length of time we estimate it will take for Norway/NATO to mobilize most of itís forces. Our ground attack is only meant to divert Norwegian forces away from reacting to our attacks on their airbases. The primary Norwegian forces are aimed at border defense. We will give them something to fight.
    C. The Norwegians have planned and prepared for partisan operations for 60 years such operations are anticipated to be on par with those experienced in Afghanistan, if not more severe. Consequently Prestone forces will be required for security of the rear once their operational goals have been met. Additional forces will be assigned for subsequent assaults.
    D. Operational security is of paramount concern. Only the airborne and Spetznatz units will be aware of the true targets. The ground components will train against generic forces as standard procedure. The Border forces will be alerted and moved to their attack positions under complete communications blackout once alerted. The air components will be trained on similar terrain within Russia and not told until 24 hours before the operation begins what the targets are. Once the units know the targets they must maintain complete communications blackout. Special GRU units will take over the daily routine communications traffic as not to alert NATO to our preparations. The normal army divisions and other assets of the military district will not be informed ahead of the alert and should make NO advanced preparations. The appearance of peacetime routine is imperative.