To: CINC, Theater Command & Staff

Cc: All subordinate Northern Fleet commands

From: Admiral Bunzov, CINC Northern Fleet

Encryption: High

Re: MISSION CLARIFICATION

Gentlemen:

After listening to some discussion (informally) among your staff, it has come to my attention that there may be some confusion or ambiguity regarding your mission as well as other issues. Just to be on the safe side, I will attempt to clarify the orders that were issued to you by our glorious and infallible General Staff. (What was that coughing I heard just now? Take a cough drop, please. <g>)

I have heard some discussion from some of you at Theater Command about your mission only lasting for 3 days. While it is true that our initial operations will center around a 72-hour transit of our sub packs into the open Atlantic, you will be responsible for a period of time that goes far beyond that point. In fact, about 20 days to be exact.

As discussed previously, our strategic goal is to gain control of the Atlantic sea lanes. While a surge of 18 subs through the GIUK gap will certainly make victory likely, this is by no means so overwhelming a number that we can dust our hands of the affair and assume our victory to be a fait d'acomplis. Even if we should be so fortunate that every sub safely transits into the Atlantic they will be continually hunted and proscecuted by NATO surface and submarine forces during their entire time at sea. They will also be subject to ASW air patrols based out of the UK, Iceland, Greenland and other locations. Also, any time these subs attack NATO shipping their location will be known, increasing the likelihood of detection and destruction.

In short, the Atlantic campaign may not be decided merely by the number of subs that make it to the Atlantic on Day 3, but by how much tonnage they can sink in the ensuing days and weeks, and how well they can evade NATO ASW assets and keep supplied with torpedoes and missiles.

Therefore, given how much is being left to chance, and in an attempt to help "load the dice" in our favor, the GenShtab suggested that you consider other options -- besides the sub breakout -- as a means of ensuring sea control in this vital region. Even if the extra assets or missions sent to the Atlantic only forces NATO to delay their sub-hunting and deal with the new threats first, this will have accomplished something. But this idea is only a suggestion. You know best. Higher Command is looking to you for your expertise in this type of mission., sof you feel the sub breakout is enough to guarantee victory then neither the GenShtab nor I will overrule you; it is your decision to make.

As stated earlier, we estimate that we can guarantee victory if we can prevent all shipping from getting through to Europe for approximately 20 days, or three weeks. If no allied shipping from North America successfully reaches Europe by that time, then -- and only then -- can we claim a complete, glorious and unqualified victory [Translated: If no convoys get through, REDFOR wins all 50 points for Stage II.] Any supply ships that do get through, however, will reduce our margin of our victory, accordingly.

We envision that while the hunting should be easy for the first few days (due to the large number of merchant vessels at sea which were caught in a wartime situation by surprise), our task will become more difficult as NATO begins to form protective convoys and increases its ASW forces in the area. Also, if the US is as capable as we think they are of amassing a large merchant navy in a few weeks time, our subs are likely to score a lot of kills but may soon run out of torpedos and missiles, forcing them to return home and resupply. We will have two "milk cows" (supply subs) and one or two trawlers secretly running supplies to our subs when we can, but these units will themseles need to replenish their stores and cannot be everywhere at once). So homeward voyages and return voyages to the Atlantic may be necessary to ensure complete victory. This will keep the pressure on our ground forces to hold onto our forward positions in the Norwegian Sea for as long as possible in order to deny bases to the enemy and support our safety corridor to the Atlantic.

It should be noted here that while we will respect your concern about preserving our ground forces, maintaining control of the Norwegian Sea as long as possible should be of paramount importance. Thus, the loss of ground forces will not be counted against you very heavily as long as they help us attain our final objective. (Your men should only be too proud to die in place if it comes to that, knowing the great contribution they are making to their Motherland!) Of course if you can manage to preserve your forces, so much the better, but this concern should not take precedence over the main operational objective.

On another note, I have also heard talk about the "suicidal" nature of the forward position of our CVBGs, and that they are not equipped to be part of the sea control element in the Atlantic. While this may have been a reasonable assumption based on the situation that was forecast some weeks ago, the actual situation may not be the same as what you projected. At least as far as I can see, there is nothing in our current intel that would suggest our CVBGS or our SAG are in any immediate danger at this time. If you continue to believe otherwise, that is your call and I will trust your judgement. But if our forces truly match or possibly even overpower those of NATO at this time it seems strange to think of their current position near the GIUK gap as "suicidal." But again, I leave this area of decision-making up to you, and after all you could still be absolutely correct in your assessment. I only mention this so that you do not get too attached to what you thought was so definite in the planning stages [Stage 1] and that you base your decisions soley on the intel and the situation that is presented to you now [Stage II].

Finally, I note some confusion on the part of the senior officers of Theater Command over the issue of NATO submarine detections. The previous description of the way in which our forward-deployed subs have been "compromised" was obviously not clear, or perhaps in error. To repeat: the primary cause of increased detection was 1) SOSUS, and 2) SURTASS vessels. These two sources of detection have apparently helped the US corner our subs using sonobuoys and dipping sonars, narrowing down the area that they have to search. The increased number of typical MAD detections was only a guess on our part, based on the increased probability of flying over a sub which has already been (partially) localized. If this was unlikely based on the statements above then I apologize for introducing that as a possibility. I'm an old battlecruiser-era desk jockey whose knowledge of these things is apparently less accurate than I thought. In any case, it was the SOSUS and the SURTASS that we believe are what gave the US a momentary edge in detection capability. In speaking to the GenShtab earlier, they now feel as though this sudden rash of detections was not indicative of what is to be a regularly expected occurence but rather the result of simply plain bad luck. I should also note that the General Staff's suggestion that all of these subs would be sunk as soon as war started may have been premature, or at the very least, a bit pessimistic. Our Fleet J3 believes -- and the Russian Admiralty now concurs -- there is still a chance that some or even most of them will have escaped detection by H-Hour. (Part of the confusion was that there was a time lag between the time the subs reported and the time we received the information through the chain of command. So they have more time to escape than we at first realized).

Most importantly, the good news is that SOSUS detection will soon be neutralized by our Iceland operations (Opn. Avon Calling, and the Kuznetsov strike) so this is no longer a concern of ours. We also expect that the SURTASS vessels will be eliminated soon, given how undefended they are (at least at this time). The main thing is that there is really no need to "investigate" the problem of increased sub detections. My apologies in behalf of the General Staff if they confused you.

I hope this helps to clear up any misunderstandings.

Respectfully,

Admiral of the Fleet Runyur Bunzov
CINC Northern Fleet,
Commanding