Defense

Intelligence

Agency

Intel Report

Re: China

December 10, 2009

Reference: Taiwan Strait Situation Map 1210

The following report has been compiled from data derived from the following satellites:

KH12-B -- Overflight @ 1000 hours
Lacrosse-11 -- Overflight @ 1300 hours
Mercury (SIGINT) -- Geosynchronous (24/7)

Due to the heavy workload this week we only had enough manpower for a quick spot-check of key indicators to make sure there have been no critical developments in the last 10 days. However, the intel we did gain was significant, despite that lack of detail.

A brief overview of IMINT data over the Taiwan Strait has detected three major trends since October 1:

Chinese ground forces along the coast of China near Taiwan have begun to relax their posture to some degree, with many units getting in some R&R or recreation activities at their local makeshift bases.

Naval forces are becoming more aggressive in the Taiwan Strait, causing, or at least appearing to cause, aggressive bumping incidents, near collisions and other sources of disputes between each other's navies. Such accidents do in fact happen occasionally, but they seem to be happening disproportiantely more often between these two countries lately than they did some months back, and it appears the the PLAN is clearly the instigator in almost all cases. Also, it has been noticed that both Chinese frigates and patrol boats have ventured out a bit further from the coast than they had before in what appears to be an effort to support their recent claim to territorial waters that include waters surrounding Republic of China (see ENN, Dec. 10 issue).

A number of new amphibious ships have completed construction, including 2 LSTs and 1 LSD. With these ships added to the PLAN it would appear that China now has the capability to provide sealift for two full armies, plus all support units.

By far the most alarming increase in activity is China's air force, which has been making simulated interceptor attacks on both the US and ROC air groups. One such simulated attack run was against CARGRU-3 in the northern sector of the Taiwan Strait. Another was a similar approach (which looked like an attack run) on ROC air force CAP aircraft. These harrassing attack groups are being rotated on a fairly rapid schedule, keeping each crew fresh while the ROC and US carrier air wings become quickly fatigued. At the current rate of responding to Chinese "nuisance" attacks, the US carrier group will need to be relieved much sooner than their usual 3-month time limit for patrols.

Chinese airfields have now been identified and mapped throughout the Taiwan Strait region. Each airfield is a headquarters for an air division, which generally consists of 3 regiments of 3 squadrons of 3 flights of 3-4 a/c, plus a squadron of recce, transport and other support aircraft. Air divisions are grouped into air armies whose headquarters are co-located and subordinate to the regional army group headquarters (yellow circles) shown on the situation map. Three squadrons of J-11s are located at each air army headquarters base (the airfield nearest the group army headquarters).

October 1, 2009

Reference: Taiwan Strait Situation Map 1001

This is an update to the previous satellite intel report, dated August 20 (see August 20 report, below).

In the past week, an EO-IR and an SAR IMINT satellite, plus a full-spectrum SIGINT satellite (Mercury) were tasked to the region of eastern China in order to ascertain the level of military activity in this region. Both IMINT satellites overflew the target region at about 1400 daily. SIGINT surveillance was 24/7.

Naval Activity

The Chairman Mao exercise, which is a large-scale, regularly scheduled exercise on October of each year, was significnatly larger this year than any other. The exercise involved 22 surface combatants, including 8 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 mine warfare vessels and an amphibious flotilla of 7 Yukan and 13 Shan LSTs (each with a capacity of 150 troops, 16 tanks), 4 Yuting LSTs (each capable of carrying 2 large transport helos plus troops, 30 Yuliang LSMs (each with a capacity of about 100 troops, 3 tanks) plus about 100 LCUs for carrying heavy equipment. Much of the equipment consisted of trucks and other simple vehicles for the sake of the exercise. The exercise concluded on Hainan Island in the South China Sea, with the purpose of improving China's mass amphibious landing capability. This exercise has been going on every year for the past 10 years. After ENDEX on September 30, most of the ships involved with the exercise dispersed to their various home ports along China's coast, primarily between Shantou and Fuzhou along the Taiwan Strait. Interestingly, many of the ground forces did not take part in the Chairman Mao exercise, even though the finale of the exercise was designed to provide training in amphibious operations.

The amphibious vessels, when combined with the various troopships, break bulk merchants and other ocean-going sealift assets under Chinese control, would have a combined lift capacity for two, possibly three armored or mechanized divisions. This would require virtually every break bulk freighter under the Chinese flag, however, and the loading and unloading process would be very slow, since each vehicle would have to be loaded or unloaded by crane. It should be noted that three divisions would not be anywhere near enough to pose a threat to Taiwan, which has has at least that many divisions at instant-readiness and another two armies it could call up within 60 days time.

Theoretically, more lift could be provided for China by commandeering their massive number of smaller coastal vessels such as light steamers, trawlers, barges, junks and other small craft that operate up and down the coast. Such a flotilla might be capable of carrying an entire army, but one that is comprised mostly of troops and trucks, with little armor. Even if such an operation were undertaken, the risks are great. Bad weather, for example, could destroy much of the flotilla before it even arrived, since most small craft used in littoral shipping are not built for heavy seas. Loading and unloading would also be a problem if these craft do not have access to a port. And because these boats would be so frail, it would be possible to sink them with nothing more than a 50 cal. machine gun. Needless to say, conducting an opposed landing on a beach with such a force would prove costly, if not devastating. Still, the sheer mass of this type of deployment would pose a significant threat to Taiwan, stretching their ability to distribute ordnance efficiently in order to kill as many craft as possible and deny the PLA a beachhead. Just one successful breach could open up a major front on Taiwanese soil, which could later be expanded and exploited.

Indicators of a massive, small-craft type of deployment would include a pronounced increase in port traffic, perhaps so much as to cause a near-gridlock situation up and down the coast. This would easily be detected by local US and Taiwanese intelligence operatives, though it might take a few extra days to perceive a trend occurring on a national scale without assigning extra HUMINT resources for this task.

Ground activity

IMINT analysis shows an even higher concentration of troops along the coast than the last report, though the additional forces are probably the disembarked troops from the Chairman Mao exercise. Most of these forces are made up of motorized infantry -- essentially a lot of troops crammed onto trucks. A couple of divisions previously reported as "mechanized" in the last report were in error, they were actually regular infantry. A large number of supply shipments have arrived in the ports via both truck and rail, though we have not seen any transfer of these supplies to the ships as of yet. (Thiough this could have been conducted at times between satellite overflights.)

Mercury SIGINT data, which was not available during the August 20 reporting period, indicates the presence of three army group headquarters, ten army headquarters and between 30-35 division headquarters. Roughly two-thirds, if not more, of these division HQs were located along the coast. SIGINT has also detected the presence of at least one FT2000 SAM battery at each division HQ, along with a battery of KS-1s at each of the army and army group headquarters.

Also spotted in the region were a number of SSM launchers. A CIA operative was deployed to one launch site, located north of the coastal highway between Yungling and Sui'lan, who sent back detailed photos of the missiles themselves, which have now been ID'd as CSS-5s, or DF-21As. Another operative, who was sent to a second site located in the mountains between Hui'an and Putian, farther to the north, has not been heard from.

The latest breakdown on Chinese forces along the coast is as follows:

Air activity

Chinese air activity has increased in the region of Shantou and the South China Sea during the last two weeks, most likely in response to the US carrier group that has been deployed in that area. These aircraft included mostly J7s and J8s, though IMINT analysis revealed at least one squadron of the new FC-1 aircraft has been deployed to the Shantou area, a fighter that is reportedly as agile and fast as the F-16. This aircraft was reported as being still in prototype as recently as June of this year, so it is not likely that China has a great number of these yet.

Order of Battle update

It should be noted that a PLA army is smaller than the western counterpart by a considerable margin. In fact, an "army" is more closely compared to a reinforced US infantry division with Army HQ assets, while an entire Chinese "army group" would equate with a force somewhere between a large, reinforced corps and an under-strength army in the US.

Armored divisions are most often comprised of T-80s, though there are still a large number of divisions that have tanks based on the T-62. "Mechanized" divisions use primarily the YW-531 APC, (which the North Koreans copied in large numbers as the VT 323 IFV). Less than half of China's infantry divisions are mechanized, however, as most are just infantry divisions made up of some 8,000-10,000 troops with a motor pool of some 800 trucks. Trucks are also used to tow a large number of 152mm artillery pieces and 100 and 125mm anti-tank guns.

August 20, 2009

Reference: Taiwan Strait Situation map 0820. This map is accessible as a detail of the Western Pacific situation map, in the Map area.

To see the location of US forces in the Pacific, see the most recent Western Pacific and South Pacific situation maps.

Background

This is a comprehensive report on the military buildup that has been going on along the coast of the Taiwan Strait since July 1. Mission duration was 5 days, from August 2 to August 6, with 3 days for processing and analysis. A KH12 (B) was used to observe the coastal areas and a Lacrosse (-10 ) SAR satellite was tasked for the interior regions. The KH12 gave us good visibility over the Chinese coast (as this is the area it was last targeted for) with overflights at about 1000 hours each morning. The Lacrosse overflew a track from Beijing to the Gulf of Tonkin, about 250 miles inland from the Taiwan Strait though its detection range covered the coastline. Its time over the target area was not ideal, however, with a nightly overflight time of the coastal region being approximately 2230. A more significant handicap was that no SIGINT satellite was available for this mission.

Taiwan intelligence has noted no change in commercial or military maritime traffic in the Strait, or any sudden appearance of troopships in any of the Chinese ports, though it is theoretically possible that at least two or three PLA divisions could embark for Taiwan using just the commercial ships that are available on any gibven day. Taiwanese agents have infiltrated most of the Chinese ports, giving Taipei early warning of any major embarkation of troops or vehicles.

Analysis

As reported on July 1, a major portion of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been deployed along the Taiwan Strait, with the largest concentrations of forces being seen in and around the major ports. While we have no recent SIGINT data by which to determine the number of army and division-level headquarters, a look at the sheer number of troops and vehicles alows us to estimate the number of divisions we are dealing with. A comparison of the two surveys shows a noticeable increase in overall deployments since July 1.

According to what we know of the PLA's organizational structure, the TO&E of a typical army in the PLA is pretty much standard. Each army contains up to four divisions, which we believe to include infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, airborne, and air support elements. From the above survey, it would appear that there are at least three very well-supported armies lined up along the Strait and possibly more. Without SIGINT data to determine the number and size of headquarters units in the region, however, it is difficult to determine the force structure that we are presently looking at.

While the Chinese air force (PLAF) has not appeared to be increasing in numbers in this region since our previous survey in July, the numbers are still very high compared to past years. We currently estimate, in fact, some 1000 fighter-attack aircraft in the region, including 300 J7s and J8s, 250 Su-30MKs, 150 Q-5Ms and 150 Xian H-7s, a strike aircraft that we have not seen fielded in large numbers for quite a few years. We suspect they may have been kept in storage away from Western eyes until this time. About 350 transport aircraft were sighted at various air bases in the area as well. While we saw very little bomber activity, we did spot shipments of YJ-6/C-601 and YJ-8 ASMs being stockpiled at two different air bases, both of which are known to operate B-5 (Beagle) and B-6 (Badger) intermediate-range bombers. Acitivity of these air forces was difficult to determine, since our two satellites only spot-checked the target area twice a day.

A careful study of our KH12 IMINT revealed some 28 surface-to-air missile sites along the coastal region, though because these are often camouflaged quite well we expect we probably missed a good deal more. (Without SIGINT surveillance we were unable to detect the number of active tracking radars, which helps determine the number of SAM sites with greater accuracy.) Each observed site was comprised of a battery or more of SAMs, the most common SAM being the KS-1. At least 10 of these sites, however, contained a battery or more of Russian-made S-300s.

Chinese naval forces were also quite active in the Strait, with as many as ten or more squadrons of destroyers and frigates seen patrolling the region. These ships often appeared to be moving at less than 10 knots, indicating they may be conducting ASW sweeps. More noteworthy were the almost 100 small fast attack craft that were seen patrolling the shoreline. Such a vigilant level of patrolling would make it difficult to insert special forces teams.

A large number of naval units in this region were in port, primarily in Shantou, Xiamen and Fuzhou. Each of these ports included from 5-10 destroyers (mainly of the Luda class) and some 10-20 frigates (mostly Jianghu class), which provided replacement patrols along the Taiwan Strait. Also sighted in port were some 30-50 smaller missile craft of various types, 20-30 torpedo boats, over 100 small patrol craft and between 150 and 200 amphibious vessels of various types. While these amphibious ships could certainly land a sizeable force in Taiwan -- probably 5 divisions or so, it is believed that this is still too limited to ferry the massive ground forces that would be needed to subdue a prepared, resolved Taiwanese defense. A close watch of Chinese-flagged merchant vessels indicates a slight increase in troop-carrying capability, but no more than an additional 3 or 4 divisions with limited support, since most of these ships are not Ro-Ro types and could only transport vehicles by way of very slow cranes and derricks, providing of course that a Taiwanese port had already been seized. This brings the current amphibious lift capacity in the region up to about 9 divisions. By current estimates -- and these estimates are very rough -- we believe that China would have to be able to transport at least 12 divisions to Taiwan in order to have a reasonable success of winning and maintaining its subjugation of the population there. This estimate takes into account projected losses of amphibious vessels during the assault, which we predict would be extremely high.

END REPORT.