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Intel Report: Croatia
Last updated: November 1, 2009
Situation Update:
Reports from SITREP 1101 have been compiled and plotted to create an updated operations map of Zagreb.
Situation Update:
Reports from SITREP 1014 have been compiled and plotted to create an updated operations map of Zagreb.
Serbian Weapons Update
According to our records, Yugoslavia acquired a modest number of S-300 SAMs back in 2005, during Russia's "military yard sale." The omission of this acquisition from the DIA World Order of Battle Survey was due to an error in records-keeping on our end; a secretary had evidently misfiled a number of key documents concerning Yugoslavian weapons purchases so that their data was never entered in the report. We believe the systems were delivered by train which transited to Yugoslavia by way of Bulgaria. The exact number of S-300 batteries (also known as SA-10 Grumble) that were purchased is unknown, but so far SIGINT satellite reconnaissance has confirmed the presence of some 10 to 15 flap-lid targeting radar emissions of the type used by the S-300 system, suggesting that there are about that many batteries in operation at this time. Most of these S-300s are currently located at Yugoslavian air bases and C3I centers, with a few positioned at key transportation junctions and in and around the city of Belgrade. So far, it appears that these SAM units have only been deployed to key strategic locations inside Yugoslavia such as air fields, C3I and other important infrastructure targets, but have not as of yet been deployed forward to locations inside Croatia.
In response to J3's request to check our latest intelligence on Yugoslavian equipment against our DIA World Order of Battle Survey document, it seems that indeed there were one or two discrepancies. The most significant error was the fact that Yugoslavia now has a fair number of M-84 tanks. At first this did not seem to be such an important item, as one resource describes the M-84 as a modified T-72, similar to a T-74. However, upon further inspection it seems there were a great many modifications to this tank made specially to meet Yugoslavian demands. It now appears that the Yugoslav M84 resembles the T-72 only in outward appearance. The M-84A has a computerized fire control system, ballistic data sensor and a day/night sighting device incorporating a laser rangefinder and a second-generation image intensifier. In addition to the new fire control system, the M-84A MBT has better armor protection and numerous other improvements including a V12 diesel developing 1,000hp which gives it a better power-to-weight ratio than that of the T-72, and therefore greater mobility. In light of these many improvements, it would be more correct to assume that this tank is more closely akin to a T-80U than a T-72. It is estimated that Serbia has over 300 M-84 tanks, in addition to the 800 T-55s reported in the World Order of Battle Survey.
A few other missed items were noted as well. While the majority
of Serbia's APC type is made up of BTR-80s, other APC types include
the M-80 AIFV and the M-60 APC. More significant is the increase
in Serbian MiG-21s and MiG-29s, which have nearly tripled in number
since the July 1 World Order of Battle Report (no doubt due to
Yugoslavia going out of its way to hide the increase in aircraft.)
Incidentally, the exact model type for these aircraft are the
MiG-21F and the MiG-29A.
Date: October 10, 2009
Situation Update:
Reports from SITREP 1010 have been compiled and plotted to create an updated operations map.
Croatia Operations Map 1010 (Oct. 10)
Date: October 1, 2009
On the morning of Sept. 29, a fully supported Serbian corps consisting of 10 brigades (6 mechanized, 4 armored), including army AD and artillery assets, began a rapid deployment west along the Croatian corridor north of Bosnia. The attack began with 2 mechanized infantry brigades and one tank brigade moving westward from their previous positions in the vicinity of Osijek, followed by an estimated seven other brigades. Three artillery battalions, previously located in the vicinity of Sombor in Serbia, crossed into Eastern Croatia as well.
A Croat infantry battalion in Osijek, the only Croat unit stationed near the Serbian border, has not been heard from since early afternoon of the 29th and is presumed to have surrendered.
By late afternoon, two Croat Guard brigades (a mix of mechanized and motorized infantry) arrived at their respective "stop-line" positions some 50 miles from the eastern border, as directed by SACEUR. Both were under attack within a few hours of their arrival and had little time to prepare their defense. Losses were heavy in the north, with the Croat brigade being reduced to half-strength in the first hour as trucks and APCs tried finding advantageous hull-down positions to face their attackers. Dismounted infantry had moderate success knocking out some Serb armor but were forced to withdraw in the face of overwhelming firepower from a massive number of APCs late in the day. On the morning of the second day Serbian artillery opened fire on these positions, reportedly decimating the Croat defenders, though they reported they had still not withdrawn from a key road junction in the area, and that the Serbs were being forced to find alternate routes west.
In the town of Slavonski Brod in the south the Croats fared better, as there were already two infantry battalions well dug-in east of the town since Sept 28th. These units delayed the Serbian advance for some two or three hours, giving a Croat Guard brigade (which had also been ordered to deploy to the area by SACEUR) time to prepare a hasty defense before the first wave of Serbian armor penetrated to their positions. Together, the Guard brigade and the two infantry battalions managed to put up good resistance and delay the Serbian advance for the entire day. Serbian air strikes were warded off by US 16th Air Force CAP out of Aviano AFB, Italy, preserving the Croat defense another day.
Meanwhile, the Serb advance found a major hole in between the northern and southern Croat positions, as several brigades surged through this region. (Apparently a third Croat Guard brigade near Zagreb which was slated to fill the gap had some difficulty getting off the mark the day before and was a good 12 hours behind schedule.)
Late in the afternoon of September 30, a Serbian armored brigade -- the spearhead of the attack -- caught the third Croat Guard brigade approaching head-on in a meeting engagement at a point halfway between Zagreb and the eastern border. The result was a bloodbath, as the Croats tried to back up or pull off the road and escape the oncoming tanks. The commander was inexperienced and did not have a plan at the ready for such an eventuality. (All training had been focused solely on finding advantageous hull-down defensive positions well ahead of any Serbian attack. The idea of a meeting engagement was not even considered). Within an hour Croat Army Headquarters in Zagreb reports having lost all contact with the brigade.
For a situation map showing deployments throughout the Serbo-Croatian region as of October 1, see the Situation Map 1001, below. For
Croatia Situation Map for October 1
Croatia Operations Map for October 1
Naval / Marine Action
While the Serbian attack was being launched in northern Croatia, another attack was launched in the south -- beginning with an amphibious landing of Yugoslavian marines on the Prevlaka Peninsula, a spit of land controlling the entrance to Kotor, one of the two main Yugoslavian naval bases. The peninsula was being held by a detachment of Croat infantry, and fell to Yugoslavian forces within a few hours.
Meanwhile, within minutes of the first reports of fighting in the north, a Yugoslavian frigate launched several missiles on a pair of shadowing patrol boats, sinking one of them in less than 3 minutes. The other patrol boat, whose missiles could not reach the frigate, withdrew at high speed to the northeast .
History
CIA report, July 20: (from 0720 SitRep)
In-country operatives in Croatia report there is a major disturbance going on at a steel mill on northeastern Croatia involving a labor strike which is quickly turning into a national issue. A wildcat strike has been threatened by other steel mills in the region. This has been causing great tension between labor and Croatian government. Serbian forces have been reportedly building up in the northeast, perhaps to take advantage of the situation by quickly invading and annexing northeastern Croatia while country is in turmoil. This would give Serbia a much needed steel resource. Locals in this region may be in favor of such an event happening as many are of Serbian decent. Unfortunately, we do not believe that if this occurred that Serbia would stop there. Rather, they would likely to all the way to Zagreb and force a Serbian overthrow of the entire country. This would mean that the Serbian minority would be in control of the Croatian majority, with the military backing of Serbia proper. The UN would no doubt authorize NATO to prevent this from happening at all costs, but reacting sooner rather than later will may prevent a full-scale US-Serbian Balkans war later. You may want to direct satellite assets to Serbian-Croatian frontier to see how prepared Serbia is for attack.
Things now appear quiet between Serbia and Bosnia, however.
The concern was originally stirred up by reports from the locals
of heavy Serbian armor being heard moving in the vicinity of the
Bosnia-Serbia border. After learning that these tanks were moving
in a northerly direction -- parallel to the border, not toward
it -- it now appears that these tanks were part of the forces
being assembled near Croatia. This came as a sigh of relief for
many Bosnians, many of whom still bear the scars from the last
war with Serbia. There is a UN IFOR unit still in Bosnia.
Suggest SACEUR propose a change its location to northeastern Croatia
instead. This unit is small but as representatives of the UN it
may be enough to at least give the Serbians pause before invading.
(See also the report on Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, in the Intel section of your planning area.)
DIA report, September 10
Overview
Apparently Croatia's intelligence network is not very strong, as the Zagreb government was apparently caught by surprise to learn of rumors of Serbian forces massing in the northeast. At this time, only 1 Croatian infantry brigade has been deployed to the east, and only 1 battalion of this brigade has been forward deployed to the border region. This will prove to be no match for the Serbian brigades now lining up along the border, should they decide to enter Croatia -- especially if Serbia uses artillery, which is likely given their tactics in Sarajevo and other campaigns. Serbia also has a strong air force of more than 10 fighter and attack aircraft, which would more than devastate any Croatian response.
The one mitigating factor in all this is that in order for Serbia to have any chance of succeeding in convincing the world (and most especially, the UN) that they are merely coming to the rescue of their fellow Serbians, it would not do well for them to unleash a full-scale war on Croatia. Such an action would make it clear that the whole affair is one of Serbian expansionism, backed by the Yugoslavian government. In such a case, the UN would have no choice but to send in large forces -- mainly led by the US -- to remove Serbia forcibly from Croatia. Should events start to lean this way, however, it is imperative that a response to the Serbian threat be executed as soon as possible. The longer the Serbs have to take Croatia and dig in, the harder, and bloodier, it will be to remove them.
CIA Report, September 1:
Serbian forces continue build along the northeast border of Croatia, according to recent satellite data and shared intelligence from NATO allies. In fact, we have reason to believe that several brigades appear ready to steamroll west at a moment's notice, with only a single Croatian infantry brigade standing in their way. While they may have an advantage as a defender fighting on home soil, Serbian artillery will likely keep them suppressed, if not shattered, while heavy armored and mechanized infantry forces envelop Croatian positions rapidly, cutting off their support.
Whether Serbia attacks or not will depend on the boldness of the Yugoslavian leader, and on the degree to which Serbo-Croatians revolt against the Croatian leadership, as they are doing now. If the government in Zagreb decicdes to pacify the workers with higher wages, the uprising may blow over and Serbia will have no reason to "save" anyone. Croatian leaders are reluctant to agree to workers' demands, however, claiming that the workers are already paid handsomely by Croatian standards and that the union is using the issue as an excuse to ignite a war between Croatia and Serbia and have Serbia, their true country of heritage, take over.
So far, Croatia has not been able to satisfy worker demands and the talks have entered a stalemate. As protests grow louder, the chance for an invasion on behalf of the "oppressed ethnic Serbians" is more likely.
Meanwhile, the UN Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia is currently facing a tough decision. NATO headquarters is consideraing whether to redeploy some units to Croatia and force the Serbs to a stand-off. If successful, it could by the Croatian government the time it needs to deploy its own forces eastward, while at the same time (hopefully) defusing the situation with the steel workers.
The downside of this plan is that moving too many UN forces
to Croatia will leave Bosnia vulnerable to a continuation of ethnic
cleansing by the Bosnian Serbs. And if too few units are sent,
and Serbia attacks, the UN units could be lost along with the
Croatian infantry.
DIA Reconnaissance Report, September 10:
The following is a combined report on the situation in Croatia using a combination of recon assets, including U-2 overflights, on loan from the 99th Reconnaissance Squadron in Akrotiri which was previously slated for overflying Libya and Syria. The Syria mission was dropped in order to pursue this mission in Croatia.
See the Croatia ports and bases map to see where Croatian naval and air force units are based.
A 0920 situation map is still available, showing Serbian positions prior to September 20. Notes for this map follow:
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NOTES The Croatian Guard brigades are not crack troops as their name would suggest, but merely troops that are adequately trained on a year-round basis. Their regular infantry units, however, are not as well trained as troops in most European armies, and certainly less so than the troops of the Serbian army. Croatia has a rather immense artillery corps and SAM corps, however, owing to their bitter lessons in the past at the hands of Serbian artillery and air power. Croatia has a large coastline but an almost non-existent navy. Currently there are only 3 patrols in the entire Adriatic, each consisting of 2 Rade Koncar PFM missile craft. These carry the RBS-15 SSM. Croatia also has 1 submarine, but its wherabouts at the moment are unknown. Serbia, meanwhile, has a rather large navy and covets Croatia's coastline for this reason. A standing patrol of 3 surface groups, each consisting of 1 frigate (Kotor class) which are flanked by a pair of their own Rade Koncar PFMs. Patrols from each side have been shadowing the other in anticipation of possible hostilities. Serbia also has 4 submarines (2 Sava SS and 2 Heroj SS) plus 5 Una SSI for special forces operations. The wherabouts of these submarines is unknown at this time. |
END REPORT.
