TOP SECRET

CIA Special Report: Honduras

Last updated: December 1, 2009

Reference Map: Honduras Situation Map 1201

Analysis of our KH13 currently overflying western Cuba and the track of ocean north of Honduras during the period from November 20 to December 1 has revealed the following:

A medium size cargo vessel was tracked to the port of Puerto Cortes on the western shore of Honduras, as requested by the J3-6 team. The cargo was verified to contain primarily agricultural, construction and automotive machinery of various types, including several bulldozers and about thirty fork-lift trucks. Several large crates accompanied this cargo which was labelled "spare parts" and which had all the proper customs stamps and stencils on the outside of the crate. (The KH13 is allegedly capable of reading a license plate from space if the angle is oblique enough -- the state slogan, not just the license number! -- so verification of this sort of thing would not be impossible for a satellite of this kind). All markings looked to be authentic, and the crates matched the exact type used in other shipments from the same agricultural companies. After the off-loading from the ship, the crates were observed being loaded onto trucks. All of this was under the supervision of Government troops to ensure security. Since the unloading activity had taken place in the western port of Puerto Cortes, a government-held port, it is only to be expected that the ship and its cargo could not have been smuggling supplies to the contras.

More suspicious was the small tramp steamer heading west out of Havana last week, which the J3-6 staff also requested us to look at more carefully. To begin with, KH13 photos showed that the ship was loaded with a large number of unmarked crates. These crates bore a resemblance to some broken, empy crates seen in other photographs taken over contra strongholds in Honduras. The ship left port on November 21 and for the better part of the journey tit appeared to be headed for the government-held port of La Ceiba but then on November 24, within 25 miles of shore, the ship turned east and was seen passing just south of the Islas De La Bahia before the KH13 left the area. On the following day, November 25, the KH13 overflight clearly observed the steamer passing the port of Puerto Castilla , continuing east. We expected that by the same time the following day to see the ship entering Puerto Lempira. Yet, on November 26 when our analysts checked the port there was no tramp steamer to be found in this area or even anywhere in the great lagoon (Laguna de Caratasca )-- at least not the one matching the description of the one we've been looking at. Finally, after several hours of searching IMINT data of the region (which we devoted our time to doing, since this ship was specified by J3-6 as worthy of special attention) the steamer was found -- at 85 W, 17 N -- travelling north. We have no explanation for why the ship would be at this location or going in this direction. Perhaps you might be able to shed some light on this puzzling itinerary.

While our analysts were not able to pinpoint the exact location of Contra supply points, they were able to calculate a general pattern to their movement by looking at moved earth, tire tracks, the location of trucks and other transport vehicles that match those tracks and that coincinde with the "blind spots" between daily satellite flybys. In general, the greatest amount of transportation activity among the conta strongholds occurred between the towns of Yoro, Olanchito and Tocoa, with transportion activity decreasing as you move away from this region. Our analysts were not able to pinpoint any exact supply points, however, due to the sheer size of the target area ("Honduras"). If, however, the J3-6 would like to narrow down the target area to within 500 square miles or so, we believe we will have a much better chance at finding specific supply areas -- assuming, of course, the selected region has been chosen correctly.

No Russian aircraft of any kind, either fixed wing or rotary, was detected in any of contra-held territory. Only the government -- at least as of now -- appears to have helos. Most of these are of the Mi2US gunship variety [See TacOps v.4].

It should be pointed out that no SIGINT assets were available for this region. SIGINT data should be able to help pinpoint contra communications sources, locate headquarters and determine what, if any, radars are being used. To task SIGINT resources to this region a national or theater asset asset will have to be utilized, such as a Globalhawk or U-2, which will require the approval of the appropriate Chief of Staff.

Due to so many other projects and commitments, the DIA was unable to provide any in-depth reports on the overeall rebel movement, troop movements or provide personality profiles on contra leadership. To acquire such in-depth reports, the J3-6 will have to reduce or cut back on some other intel requests during the next 10 days.

Background

The following report on Honduras is a composite report based on CIA HUMINT as well as IMINT anlaysis of our recently deployed KH13 satellite. This report will be updated, when possible, as necessary.

November 20, 2009

While the Contra movement in Honduras has not been making the news, its threat to the Honduran government is nevertheless growing by the week. One of the main reasons why the news corps has not found out about this little hot spot is that the government is very adept at spin control and propaganda, where major acts of terrorism and deadly ambushes of government troops are all but erased from history as told by the official news service of the Honduran government. Reports of attrocities are squelched daily to help create the impression that nothing is wrong, and that any disrupting sounds of gunfire heard by the people are more likely than not the sound of the Honduran military conducting exercises -- precisely the kind of exercises that will be helpful in serving the people should there be any insurrection, which of course, there isn't.

In truth, we have learned through KH-13 satellite photos (a KH13 was recently targeted to this country) that the government has lost their influence over nearly half the northern coastal region of the country, as the provinces of Colon, Gracias a Dios, Olancho, and Yoro are mostly under Contra control. This is essentially the same territory that the Contras controlled some four or five months ago, which means that the government has until now successfully contained the Contras influence from spreading. However, there is one important difference between the current situation and that of several month ago: the Contras now appear to be much better armed.

Back in July, the rebels were thought to have no more than AK-47s, grenades, and an occasional heavy machine gun. Now, through an unknown supply route, these same rebels are equipped with Saxhorn AT-7s and a plentiful number of RPGs, 100 mm anti-tank guns (already camo-painted to match Honduras jungle colors, which would have fooled even the KH13 if it weren't for the satellite's IR capability).

Judging from the wreckage of several dozen Scorpion tanks and BRDM2 armored vehicles, there have been a number of pitched battles at various locations, particularly near the towns of Juticalpa, Catacamas and Salamas in the province of Olancho. And from the looks of things, the government is losing ground.

While the government is very much right-wing and somewhat disturbingly totalitarian, the only evidence we have of any cruelty to prisoners (a claim made by the Contras in their leaflets) appear to be done only to the Contras themselves. By an large, most of the people of Honduras still support the government. Of course, this may be in part due to te fact that they do not have any idea how strong the Contra movement really is. One thing the people of Honduras do not want, however, is to be a pawn of the US. They despise what they see is US corporate imperialism, and would rather have a strict, even somewhat despotic ruler of their own kind than one who is a puppet of the US.

We, however, have a higher agenda that goes beyond just the welfare of the Honduran people, and that includes suppressing and if possible eliminating any destabilizing revolutionary overthrowing of a sovereign, appointed government of the people -- particularly if those who take over are puppets themselves of Cuba, or worse, the Russian Union. Should either of those countries get a strong foothold in Honduras, the spread of a Latin-American axis of Russian-sponsored socialism can't be far behind. And even if only Honduras fell to communistic rule, that alone could be a major threat to US security if a Russian naval base or air base were built so close to our borders.

So, while Honduras does not represent a high-level threat to US interests right now, it could very quickly become one if it fell to the Contras. Thus we are committed to helping the Honduran government, but we must do so stealthily, so as not to alienate the government from its own people.

Current forces

The contras are currently organized in groups of 400-600 rebels, all operating out of a temporary stronghold from which they conduct raids or attempt to spread the word of grass-roots freedom to the outlying villagers. The ideology is suspiciously similar to the dogma of Castro's brand of Communism (Castroism), which gives us more reason for believing Cuba is overtly, if not covertly, supporting the uprising.

So far, the Honduran government has managed to contain the spread of Contra activity since July through the use of vigilant patrols along roads and riverways throughout the western half of the country (having now given the western half up for lost). Patrol bases have been set up consisting of a mix of light armor and accompanying paramilitary police toting submachine guns. Patrols usually consist of 4-6 APCs and a light tank with 8-12 troops matching pace along the flanks of each vehicle. This has helped to prevent Contras from getting close-in shots with RPGs, but has provided targets for Contra snipers, who seem to go for the officers first and work their way down. This has begun to damage morale among the Government troops and may someday threaten their disintegration as a well-trained, cohesive fighting unit. Still, these constant patrols have frustrated Contra attempts to gain favor among the villagers in areas beyond their control, and occasionally the government gets lucky in locating and destroying a Contra stronghold before the rebels can escape.

Air strikes have been effective in destroying Contra forces in open fields or in exposed positions along the coast, but most of the interior terrain is jungle, making it difficult to spot enemy movements -- especially without any kind of night-vision sensors. Even our own KH13 is often fooled by the camouflage used by the Contras until a second or third pass on the following day when computer-aided comparisons of features are possible (assuming lighting conditions are near-identicle). Helicopters have been more helpful still, as they are able to hover closely and their downdraft will often disturb the camouflaging canopy, but helos are of course susceptible to incoming fire from automatic weapons, something that has taken down at least a couple of helos in the last few weeks, as evidenced by what appears to be fairly recent wreckage of government gunships.

The sum total of all these events, then, is essentially a standoff. However, we believe with the gradually declining morale of the government force and the deep resolve of the Contras which is backed by an equally fervent supporter in Fidelito Castro, that it is only a matter of time before the Leftist uprising gains ground, opening a beachhead for more direct support by Cuba and possibly even Russia.

Next steps

It would seem the most efficient way to help the government defeat the Contras is to alert them to the location of their supply caches, once we learn these locations ourselves. You might also want to advise the Hondurasn forces on general tactics for fighting guerilla warfare in the jungle with their particular equipment (see World Order of Battle Survey for details). If the Contra's current supply dumps are destroyed, and future supplies en route to the country can be intercepted (but stealthily, so as not to break any international maritime laws or give away US involvement) then even if the national troops lose a few more battles, the Contras will eventually run out of ammuniition and the uprising will in the end, collapse. We have no doubt that once this happens, the incumbent government will see to it that the Contra leaders will not see light of day ever again, thus ensuring the stability of their regime for years, perhaps decades, to come.

With less than 10 days of IMINT from our KH13, however, we still do not have much to go on at this time. We suggest either waiting for more IMINT analysis to be conducted, or, if speed is of the essence, send in an Army SF team or three to infiltrate Contra lines and search out their supply points from the ground. A Navy SEAL team is another possibility (though SEALs will do better acting stealthily along the shoreline, rivers or underwater as opposed to inland). While these units are expertly trained for such an operation and could potentially save weeks or even months in locating key strongholds and supply points, it should be noted that there is always the slight risk that such a team could be caught and that the US role in Honduras would be revealed to the public. This of course would play right into the Contras hands. Special permission for this type of operations must be sought from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will only approve such a request if you provide at least some semblance of a plan for how the SF teams should conduct their reconnaissance or any other missions you deem valuable to eliminating the Contra threat.

END REPORT.