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Satellite Intel Report

This report briefly describes the current level of our satellite technology as well as the satellite capability of other countries. For an up-to-the-minute status report on the location and fuel reserve of each satellite as well as the upcoming launch schedule for the next year, please refer to the NRO Satellite Status Report and the Satellite Tracking Maps, located in the Documents Library and Map library, respectively. (For details on how satellites will be gamed in this MBX, please see the document Satellites & UAVs located in the Planning Tools area.

Background: A brief history of US satellite development (2001-2009)

As a result of the wave of computer viruses that ravaged US technology during the last decade, all 5th-generation systems such as Intruder, Warfighter, the E-300 and E-305 Discoverer II (aka Starlight) as well as a number of other "black" projects slated for production after the year 2000 were either scrubbed or postponed. Any satellites already in service, however, such as the "KH" series and Lacrosse systems were given an extended production run to help keep at least a few eyes in the sky during these "lean years" of budget cuts and technological reconstruction. Thus the total number of operational satellites are far fewer today than it was 10 years ago, with little advancement in capabilities.

Current status of US satellite fleet

As of July 1, 2009, the number of US reconnaissance satellites is considered to be at the bare minimum for national defense, lagging far behind what would be considered a "secure" number in this day and age. Rather than being able to keep an eye on several countries simultaneously, we have been forced to alter each satellite's orbit frequently, leaving many of them with low fuel reserves. It is therefore paramount that we build up our satellite capability as quickly as possible.

NASA and the USAF provide replenishment and maintenance of our current fleet at a rate of one launch every two months. Launches alternate between Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Fortunately, with the computer virus behind us and with the new, high-security infrastructure in place, funds are becoming available again for more frequent launches. As of January 1st, we will be stepping up the launch rate to one launch per month. Recommendations for payloads for each launch should be brought to the attenion of the Air Force Chief of Staff. (See the NRO Satellite Status Report for details.)

Future developments

A prototype KH14 is currently being tested. This satellite has the superior optics of the KH12 and is refuelable via Space Shuttle and it will soon be ready to deploy. The project has had a history of setbacks, however, creating a feeling among the aerospace community that the system needs to be tested in laboratories first before sending it on its first mission. The final decision will rest with the Air Force Chief of Staff.

A new ASAT project is being developed based on the space-based laser system proposed back in the mid-80's. Codenamed KILROY, this ASAT is designed to maneuver above the target satellite and beam a medium-powered laser at it, causing it to overheat and eventually malfunction. It can only point downwards, though, and cannot go higher than Elevation 5 within a low earth orbit, which means it cannot target anything at E5 or in the Medium, High or Geosynchronous orbits, which is where most SIGINT satellites reside. KILROY is 95% complete and will be operational as soon as the last electronics module is assembled via a Space Shuttle mission.

We have also developed another ASAT, codenamed FRITZ, whose high-powered solar-array capacitors emit a large electromagnetic pulse (EMP) on command which effectively fries the delicate circuitry of any SIGINT satellite within a 1000 km range. Development of this system has gone smoothly with the last test meeting almost all expectations except that the EMP was too weak, only reaching out to 100 kms. This made it necessary for the satellite to approach very close to the target, a suspicious-looking maneuver that would allow the enemy to maneuver away from the ASAT. The new model should be able to disrupt the target from a long distance, hopefully before being detected. One prototype of this new model is ready for deployment at this time.

The next shuttle mission will provide the last needed piece, assuming the Joint Chiefs approve the mission. Assigning the shuttle for this mission comes with one downside, however, which is that the shuttle will not be able to bring fuel reserves to either the 8X or the Mercury, both of which are refuelable. (Check the NRO satellite status report for current fuel levels of these satellites).

Foreign Satellite Capabilities

Russia has been closing the gap in their satellite technology with the US with a new electro-optical satellite (Arkon), and a SIGINT satellite (Tselina II) that are every bit as good as our own. They also have more satellites in orbit than the US, with launches occuring about once a month, though most of these are of the older, retrievable-capsule variety with short lifespans (6 months or less) or the EORSAT type, which has relatively poor resolution. Russia is much slower at processing their data, however. Rumors of a co-orbital ASAT development in Russia have been circulating but have not been verified. One form of ASAT that Russia does have is the Gazelle and Gorgan ABM Interceptors, capable of endo- and exo-atmospheric engagements using a low-yield nuclear-tipped warhead.

China, meanwhile, appears to have made some strides in her satellite program in the last decade, having launched some four vehicles this last year. These satellites are a full grade below the US in quality, about on par with the Russian Yantar. The CIA has learned that China has invested both in the development of ASATs as well as a ground-based laser system. It is not known what stage of development these programs are in, but preliminary indications are that they are several years away from producing and launching an actual vehicle.

The UK, France and Japan all seem to have one photo-optical satellite in orbit at any one time, all basically the same in features and capability as the Russian Yantar. All three countries are far slower at processing their data, however, requiring anywhere from one to three days longer than a similar US mission. Data is shared regularly between the US and its allies, but with an added lag time in processing and administration. (In wartime, this lag time should be reduced to mere minutes.)

Both Iraq and Iran are among the satellite-capable club, with Russia providing the lift. Their satellites are of the Yantar type and are generally used to overfly Israel, though both countries are no doubt taking a peek elsewhere as the satellites make their daily rounds. The good news is that each time Russia puts up one of these satellites it slows down their own program by one more launch, allowing us some time to catch up (or at least not be overtaken). The bad news, of course, is that a country potentially hostile to the US is putting up a satellite.

Israel has launched their own satellite, called the Ofeq, which matches the characteristics of the Russian Yantar as well. One satellite is generally deployed every three to six months with its primary mission to oversee Syria. Occasionally, one is sent up to watch over Iraq as well. Israel's intelligence agency, the Mossad, is working in full cooperation with US intelligence in this region.

India and Pakistan also have satellite capability, having each launched a Badr-B satellite for border reconnaissance. This is a commercial-quality satellite that cannot make out subtle details the way even Yantar satellites can. Pakistan, who doesn't have a space program of its own, has worked out an arrangement with China to have its satellite launched on their rockets. So far, each mission has been involved in the observation of the India-Pakistan border, which is exactly the same mission as India's satellites (which India is capable of launching herself).

While other countries may not have satellites, be advised that any ally of a country that has them may, for all intents and purposes, be considered privy to this intelligence.

END REPORT.